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Abstract
A distinctive feature of a clustered observational study is its multilevel or nested data
structure arising from the assignment of treatment, in a non-random manner, to groups or
clusters of units or individuals. Examples are ubiquitous in the health and social sciences
including patients in hospitals, employees in firms, and students in schools. What is the
optimal matching strategy in a clustered observational study? At first thought, one might
start by matching clusters of individuals and then, within matched clusters, continue by
matching individuals. But as we discuss in this paper, the optimal strategy is the opposite:
in typical applications, where the intracluster correlation is not perfect, it is best to first
match individuals and, once all possible combinations of matched individuals are known,
then match clusters. In this paper we use dynamic and integer programming to implement
this strategy and extend optimal matching methods to hierarchical and multilevel settings.
Among other matched designs, our strategy can approximate a paired clustered randomized
study by finding the largest sample of matched pairs of treated and control individuals within
matched pairs of treated and control clusters that is balanced according to specifications
given by the investigator. This strategy directly balances covariates both at the cluster
and individual levels and does not require estimating the propensity score, although the
propensity score can be balanced as an additional covariate. We illustrate our results with
a case study of the comparative effectiveness of public versus private voucher schools in
Chile, a question of intense policy debate in the country at the present.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Clustered Observational Studies with Multilevel Data
Clustered observational studies are ubiquitous in the health and social sciences. Examples include
patients receiving similar treatments in hospitals, employees facing a policy change inside firms,
and students following a particular learning program within schools. Clustered observational
studies have a nested or multilevel data structure with observed and unobserved covariates both
at the cluster and unit levels. In this context, research interest typically lies in the effect of
the cluster level treatment on unit level outcomes, however this effect may be confounded by
differences in the distributions of covariates across the treatment groups both at the cluster and
unit levels. Therefore, an important question in clustered observational studies is: how to adjust
for observed covariates taking into account the multilevel structure of the data? Ideally, these
adjustments will balance covariates at the cluster and unit levels in a transparent manner, while
mimicking a target clustered randomized experiment and facilitating sensitivity analyses to hidden
biases due to unobserved covariates (Rosenbaum 2010).
Perhaps the most well-known multilevel data structure arises in educational settings, with unit
level measures such as the student’s score on a standardized test, and also cluster level covariates
such as school enrollment (Lee and Bryk 1989). Both covariates may act as confounders when
evaluating, for instance, the impact of a study program or administration regime targeted at
improving learning. A conventional approach to adjust for cluster and unit level covariates is hi-
erarchical or multilevel regression modeling. Multilevel regression models can aid causal inference
by accounting for the design of the data collection, and, under certain assumptions, by adjust-
ing for unmeasured covariates and modeling variation in treatment effects (Feller and Gelman
2015).
Nonparametric alternatives to multilevel regression modeling often rely on propensity scores (Hong
and Raudenbush 2006; Arpino and Mealli 2011; Li et al. 2013). For example, Hong and Rau-
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denbush (2006) stratify on a multilevel propensity score to approximate a two-stage experiment
where schools and students are randomly assigned to treatment within blocks. Matching methods
are extensively used in observational studies (Stuart 2010; Lu et al. 2011), however they do not
typically account for multilevel data structures.
In this paper, we develop an optimal matching strategy for clustered observational studies. Con-
trary to intuition and common practice, which first matches clusters and then matches units
within matched clusters, our strategy does the opposite: it first matches pairs of units across all
possible combinations of treated and control clusters, and, once all the possible combinations of
pairs of units across pairs of clusters are known, it then matches the clusters. As we discuss, our
strategy is optimal in the sense that it minimizes the total sum of covariate distances between
matched pairs of units (when implemented with optimal matching; Rosenbaum 1989), or that it
maximizes size of the pair-matched sample that balances covariates as required by the investi-
gator (when implemented with cardinality matching; Zubizarreta et al. 2014). With cardinality
matching, the investigator can directly balance not only the first moments of the observed co-
variates but also their entire distributions. Cardinality matching does not require estimating the
propensity score, although the propensity score can be used as an additional balancing covariate.
Even though we implement our matching strategy in a clustered observational study with two
levels —students within schools— it can readily be extended to settings with three or more levels
such as students within schools within districts. In particular, we illustrate this method on a case
study of the comparative effectiveness of public versus private voucher schools in standardized
tests in Chile. This is a question of intense policy debate in the country at the present, and we
describe it subsequently.
1.2 Private and Public Schools Under a Voucher System in Chile
In Chile in the 1980’s, the military dictatorship enacted a far-reaching educational reform as it
implemented, among others, a universal voucher system. That system, which is still in force
today, is based on a direct payment to each school as a function of daily attendance. As a result
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of this reform, a large number of private schools subsidized by the voucher emerged, and today
students in Chile can choose between three major types of schools. First, students can attend
public schools which are run by local government authorities. Second, they can attend private
subsidized schools. For both of these types of schools, the school receives a fixed amount of
voucher money for each student based on daily attendance. Private subsidized schools, however,
tend to set admissions policies, design curriculum, and they can also charge additional tuition
(copayment). These private subsidized schools are often referred to as voucher schools, even
though public schools also operate under a general voucher system. Finally, there are private
non-subsidized schools, which do not accept voucher payments from the government and are
entirely funded by student tuition. Today approximately 55% of the students attend private
subsidized schools, 37% attend public schools, and the rest attend private non-subsidized schools
(MINEDUC 2015b).
An important open question today is whether private subsidized schools deliver a better education
than public schools. Following the student movement of 2011 in Chile (TheaEconomist 2011;
TheaNewaYorkaTimes 2011) a number of initiatives have been proposed (such as prohibiting
the selection of students, co-financing, and eliminating profits for private subsidized schools;
Bachelet 2013; MINEDUC 2015a) which would likely result in closing many private subsidized
schools and replacing them with public schools. Current evidence on the effectiveness of private
subsidized schools relative to public schools is mixed. A number of studies have found that private
voucher schools increase test scores by at least 15% to 20% of a standard deviation (Mizala and
Romaguera 2001; Anand et al. 2009) though other studies have found larger effects (Sapelli and
Vial 2002, 2005). Other work has found effects that are either not statistically detectable (Hsieh
and Urquiola 2006; McEwan 2001) or are much smaller (Lara et al. 2011).
In this paper, we conduct an observational study of the comparative effectiveness of private
subsidized or voucher schools versus public schools in terms of standardized test scores. Our
study seeks to understand the likely event of closure of entire private schools and replacement
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by public schools. As such, while students and their families decide to which schools to attend
(within certain constraints), closing and replacing one type of school with another type of school
is an intervention that happens at the school level and not at the student level. Such reforms are
not as common as interventions that seek to change one aspect of a school, but these reforms
are consistent with a movement in education known as whole school or comprehensive reform.
Under whole school reform, reforms extend beyond curriculum to an overhaul of the entire school
system (Editorial Projects in Education Research Center 2004). One such example of whole
school reform in the U.S. is Success for All (e.g., Borman et al. 2007).
As we describe subsequently, our data have a multilevel structure in that we observe student level
covariates such as gender and socio-economic status as well as school level covariates such as
enrollment and whether the school is in an urban or rural area. Consistent with the hypothetical
intervention as being applied to entire schools as well as the data structure, we seek to mimic a
clustered randomized experiment in which similar clusters are assigned to treatment and control,
and furthermore, we also seek to remove overt bias to guarantee comparability at the student
level. In this manuscript, we develop a matching strategy, consistent with both the data structure
and a clustered treatment assignment mechanism, that pairs similar students within the paired
schools.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the notation and basic assumptions,
as well as the longitudinal census data and the design that we use in our study. Section 3
reviews cardinality matching for finding the largest matched sample that is balanced, explains the
multilevel matching strategy, and presents it in more generality. Section 4 evaluates the matched
sample. Section 5 analyzes the comparative effectiveness of public and private voucher schools
in Chile. Section 6 concludes with a summary and a discussion.
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2 Notation, Data, and Study Design
2.1 Notation and Assumptions
Here, we introduce the basic notation and assumptions. Before matching, we have a sample of
treated and control students within treated and control schools. As we explain in more detail in
Section 3, in our matched design we form pairs of treated and control students within pairs of
treated and control schools. Following Hansen et al. (2014), after matching there are K matched
pairs of clusters, k = 1, . . . , K, with two schools, j = 1, 2, one treated and one control, so there
are 2K units in total. Each cluster kj contains nkj > 1 individuals, i = 1, . . . , nkj, each with a
vector of observed covariates xkji. Similarly, ukji represents an unobserved covariate of individual
unit i in cluster kj. The covariates (xkji, ukji) may consist of measurements of either the student
kji or the school kj of this student. In our study, we assume that treatment assignment occurs
at the school level as whole schools are either private subsidized (voucher) or public schools. If
the jth school in pair k receives the treatment, we write Zkj = 1, whereas if this school receives
the control we write Zkj = 0, so Zk1 + Zk2 = 1 for each k as each pair contains one treated
school and one control school.
Each student has two potential responses; one response that is observed under treatment Zkj = 1
and the other observed under control Zkj = 0 (Neyman 1923; Rubin 1974). We denote these
responses as (yTkji, yCkji), where yTkji is observed from the ith subject in pair k under Zkj = 1,
and yCkji is observed from this subject under Zkj = 0. In our application yTkji is the test
score that student kji would exhibit if the student is enrolled in a private subsidized school and
yCkji is the test score this same student would exhibit if that school were converted to a public
school. Of course, we do not observe both potential outcomes, but we do observe the responses
Ykji = ZkjyTkji + (1− Zkj)yCkji. Under this framework, the observed response Ykji varies with
Zkj but the potential outcomes do not vary with treatment assignment.
Note that our notation implicitly assumes that there is no interference among units across schools.
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This assumption is often referred to as one part of the stable unit treatment value assumption
(SUTVA; Rubin 1986). In our application, this assumption implies that potential test scores of a
student in one school do not depend on the treatment assignment of students in other schools.
In this context, yTkji denotes the response of student kji if all students in school kj receive the
treatment, while yCkji denotes the response of student kji if all students in school kj receive the
control. Therefore, we do not assume that we would observe the same response from student
kji if the treatment were assigned to some but not all of the students in school kj.
Our aim is to estimate the effect on test scores of attending a private voucher school as opposed
to a public school for comparable matched students kji within matched schools kj. Therefore,
this causal effect is defined for the population of students that are comparable in terms of their
observed covariates and that are marginal in the sense that they may or not receive the treatment
(Rosenbaum 2012b). In other words, this effect is not about the students that will never be
assigned to a private voucher school, or that will never be assigned to a public school, but instead
about students that may be assigned to either of them as a function of their observed covariates.
As we explain in Section 4.2, this estimand acknowledges the fact that not all the students are
comparable in terms of observed covariates and it depends on the sample data (Crump et al.
2009). It also makes explicit that inferences to other target populations will require further
modeling assumptions. In Section 4.2 we discuss how the estimand may change when the treated
and control students are not comparable, and describe the population of students to which the
results from the matched sample in principle generalize.
To identify this effect, we assume that the school level treatment assignment is strongly ignorable
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Formally, the assumption implies that the cluster level treatment
assignment is unconfounded,
Pr(Zkj = 1|yTkji, yCkji,xkji, ukji) = Pr(Zkj = 1|xkji),
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and probabilistic
0 < Pr(Zkj = 1|yTkji, yCkji,xkji, ukji) < 1,
for each unit kji in each cluster kj (Imbens and Rubin 2015, Section 3.4). Intuitively, this
assumption implies that after matching for observed covariates there are no systematic, pre-
treatment differences in unobserved covariates between the treatment and control groups, and
that every school has a non-zero probability of receiving treatment. In Section 5.3, we assess
the sensitivity of our findings to departures from the assumption that treatment assignment is
unconfounded.
Our matched design is meant to replicate a paired group randomized controlled trial (RCT). In
a group RCT, treatment assignment occurs at the cluster, here school, level, and all units within
a cluster are assigned to receive treatment. In a paired group RCT, clusters are paired using
baseline covariates prior to randomization. However, the analogy is inexact, since we pair not
only clusters but units within matched clusters. We do this to guarantee that paired clusters
are balanced both in terms of covariates and sample size. Thus our design is comparable to a
paired group RCT, where before randomization both clusters and units within clusters are paired.
One reason to favor such a design is that randomization of clusters may not balance unit level
covariates. See Hansen and Bowers (2009) for an example where clustered allocation of treatment
left imbalances in unit level covariates.
2.2 Longitudinal Census of Students and Schools
In 1988, Chile introduced a national student assessment system known as the Sistema Nacional de
Medicio´n de la Calidad de la Educacio´n or SIMCE. The SIMCE is an “educational census.” That is,
in the SIMCE, the Chilean Ministry of Education collects data of all the students in fourth, eighth,
tenth and eleventh grades to evaluate their performance in language, mathematics and sciences.
The SIMCE data are collected roughly every two years from four different sources. First, data
are collected from students, which includes test scores that are complemented with other student
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covariates such as gender. Second, both parents and teachers complete questionnaires. Finally
for schools, student test scores are aggregated, and a few additional covariates are collected.
Students are given unique identifiers which allows us to form a true panel over a two year period.
Student records can also be linked to teacher, parent, and school level covariates.
In our study, we use SIMCE data from years 2003, 2004 and 2006. From year 2003 we use school-
level measurements of secondary-only schools before the hypothesized treatment intervention.
From 2004, we use student-level data for students in primary-only public schools when they were
in eighth grade. Finally, from 2006 we use student test scores on language and mathematics
administered when students were in the tenth grade as our outcome measures.
2.3 Data Structure and Study Design
In our study, the data structure and study design are intricately linked. We now outline how we
constructed the match to fit the data structure. One advantage of our strategy is that we can
tailor the statistical adjustment to fit the multilevel structure of the data, which is important
since we have student, parent, teacher, and school level data. We perform two matches: one
for students and one for schools. Next, we describe the covariates that form the student level
match.
For each student with test scores observed in 2006, we match on student, parent, teacher, and
primary school covariates from the SIMCE data collection in 2004. For the student match, we
first list student level covariates. The key covariate here is student test scores from the 8th
grade. In 8th grade students are tested on four topics: language, mathematics, social sciences,
and natural sciences. The student level data also measures gender. For the student match, we
also include three covariates from parents: income measured in six categories, father’s education,
and mother’s education. We also link students to primary school level measures, and we match
on primary school covariates in the student level match. At the primary school level, we match
on a five category socio-economic status indicator for each school that is created by the Chilean
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Ministry of Education. This five category indicator is constructed from questions based on
parental education, family incomes in the school and an index of school vulnerability. We also use
school level measures that are aggregates of data observed at other levels. As such, we match on
average test scores for each primary school, the number of teachers and the number of enrolled
students. Finally, in the teacher survey, teachers are asked what level of education they expect
the majority of their students to achieve. Teachers responded using a five category scale that
records responses from 8th grade to a college degree. We aggregate this measure and recorded
the median for each primary school and use it in the student level match.
The school match is based on secondary school data from 2003. Since the SIMCE forms a panel,
we can match on characteristics of the secondary schools before any student is exposed to the
treatment. That is, we match on the schools the students will attend using data from before
they attend that school. For the school match, we match on enrollment, school level math and
language test score averages, the percentage of female students in the school, average student
income, urban versus rural status, and the same five category socio-economic status indicator
for each school that is recorded for primary schools.1 Some of these covariates are aggregates
that we created from either student, teacher, or parent level data in 2003. We did not match on
several other covariates that are also observed in the 2003 data. These measures include whether
teachers are allowed class preparation time, the proportion of teachers with a post-graduate
diploma, the average teacher experience, the number of hours teachers worked per week. We
do not match on these covariates since they are plausibly part of the school level treatment.
Matching on such covariates would remove their effect on students from the final outcomes and
thus could potentially attenuate the treatment effect.
We describe the matching algorithm in greater detail in Section 3. The match is based on
integer programming which allows us to enforce different forms of balance for different covariates
(Zubizarreta 2012; Zubizarreta et al. 2014). This is relevant since we tailored the constraints for
1For student in secondary schools, the SIMCE only collects test scores on language and math. At the primary
school level, we have test scores for language, mathematics, social sciences, and natural sciences.
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each covariate. Here, we describe the different balance constraints we applied to each covariate.
For the student level covariates, we applied a mean balance constraint to primary school test score
measures, primary school enrollment, the number of teachers in the primary school, the average
expected level of educational attainment, and the proportion of female student in the primary
school. For student level test score measures, we enforced a constraint on the entire distribution
via the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic which is the maximum discrepancy in the empirical
cumulative distribution functions. For the school level match, we enforced a mean balance
constraint on secondary school test scores, missingness indicators for test scores, secondary school
enrollment, income category, SES category, urban or rural status, and the proportion of female
students in the secondary school.2
For discrete student- and school-level covariates, we used an approximate fine balance constraint.
Under fine balance, we exactly balance covariates without exactly matching. Fine balance is
achieved for discrete covariates by balancing the marginal distributions of covariates exactly in
aggregate but without constraining who is matched to whom. We applied approximate fine
balance to student sex, father and mother’s education level, parental income categories, and
primary school SES categories. See Rosenbaum et al. (2007) for a discussion of fine balance
and Rosenbaum (2010, Part II) for a discussion of different forms of covariate balance. In the
following section we describe our approach to multilevel matching.
3 Dynamic and Integer Programming for Multilevel Match-
ing
The goal of our multilevel matching strategy is to find the largest sample of matched pairs of
treated and control units within matched pairs of treated and control clusters that is balanced
on the observed covariates. For assessing the sensitivity of results to the influence of unobserved
covariates we use a sensitivity analysis proposed by Rosenbaum (1987, 2002) and tailored to
2To be precise, we required the absolute differences in means in these covariates to differ at most by 0.1
standard deviations. Please see Table 3 below.
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clustered treatment assignments by Hansen et al. (2014) (see Section 5.3 of the paper). In our
case study, units are students and clusters are schools, and, importantly, because results can be
confounded both by student and school level covariates, we match pairs of students and schools
to balance covariates at both levels. The basic tool that we use in our multilevel matching
strategy is cardinality matching which we describe subsequently.
3.1 Review of Cardinality Matching
Common matching methods attempt to achieve covariate balance indirectly, by finding treated
and control units that are close on a summary measure of the covariates such as the Mahalanobis
distance or the propensity score (see Stuart 2010 and Lu et al. 2011 for reviews). Unlike these
matching methods, cardinality matching uses the original covariates to match units and directly
balance their covariate distributions (Zubizarreta et al. 2014). Specifically, by solving an integer
programming problem, cardinality matching finds the largest matched sample that satisfies the
investigator’s specifications for covariate balance. Following Zubizarreta (2012), these specifi-
cations for covariate balance may not only require balancing the means of the covariates, but
perhaps also balancing entire distributions via fine balance (Rosenbaum et al. 2007), x-fine bal-
ance (Zubizarreta et al. 2011), and strength-k balance (Hsu et al. 2015). For example, cardinality
matching will find the largest sample of matched pairs in which all the covariates have differences
in means smaller than one tenth of a standard deviation and the marginal distributions of nominal
covariates of greater prognostic importance are perfectly balanced (fine balance). In this manner,
with cardinality matching subject matter knowledge about the research question at hand comes
into the matching problem through the specifications for covariate balance, finding the largest
matched sample that satisfies them.
Cardinality matching is well suited for studying unit-level interventions but it is unclear how
to use it for cluster-level interventions with any optimality guarantees (this same consideration
applies to other matching methods such as optimal matching). As we describe in Section 3.2,
our multilevel matching strategy uses cardinality matching to match treated and control students
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across all the possible combinations of treated and control schools, and then uses a modified
version of cardinality matching to match schools with the largest number of matched students.
As we discuss, our multilevel matching strategy can be used with other matching methods such
as optimal matching to minimize the total sum of covariate distances between matched students
within matched schools.
3.2 A Multistage Decision Strategy for Multilevel Matching
Let kt ∈ Kt = {1, ..., Kt} index the treated clusters and kc ∈ Kc = {1, ..., Kc} denote the
control clusters. Let ikt be treated unit i in treated cluster kt, with ikt ∈ Ikt = {1, ..., Ikt},
and ikc stand for control unit i in control cluster kc with ikc ∈ Ikc = {1, ..., Ikc}. Put xkt for
the vector of observed covariates of treated cluster kt, and similarly write xikt for the observed
covariates of treated unit ikt ; analogous notation applies for control clusters and units. Based
on the unit-level covariates, calculate a distance δikt ,ikc between treated unit ikt and control unit
ikc (for instance, this distance may be the robust Mahalanobis distance specified in Section 8.3
of Rosenbaum 2010). Define A and Ba as the sets of feasible solutions for the cluster- and
unit-level matches within matched clusters (hence the subindex a in Ba). In practice, A and
Ba are implemented as linear inequality constraints in an integer program and they enforce the
investigator’s requirements for covariate balance and matching structures at the cluster and unit
levels respectively (for instance, A may require the means of the cluster covariates to be balanced
and the matched groups to form pairs of clusters, and Ba may require the marginal distributions
of the unit covariates to be balanced and the matched groups to form pairs of units). Importantly,
since the requirements in A refer to clusters and those in Ba refer to units, A and Ba are disjoint.
Let I(m)kt be the set of treated units matched in treated cluster kt and I(m)t =
⋃
kt∈Kt I(m)kt be the
set of treated units matched across all treated clusters. Finally, let K(m)t be the set of matched
treated clusters.
Building upon the framework of Rosenbaum (2012a), an optimal cardinality matching of units
within clusters can be characterized by the quadruple (K(m)t , α, I(m)t , β) of assignments of clus-
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ters α : K(m)t → Kc and units β : I(m)kt → Ikc that maximize the cardinality of the set of
matched of units within matched clusters subject to the constraints in A and Ba, respectively.
If there are two cardinality matchings that satisfy the requirements in A and Ba, then we prefer
one matching over the other if it has a larger cardinality, or, alternatively, if they both have
the same cardinality, if it has a smaller sum of total distances between matched units. For-
mally, we prefer the cardinality matching (K(m)t , α, I(m)t , β) to (K˜(m)t , α˜, I˜(m)t , β˜), denoted by
(K(m)t , α, I(m)t , β)  (K˜(m)t , α˜, I˜(m)t , β˜), if |I(m)t | > |I˜(m)t |, or alternatively if |I(m)t | = |I˜(m)t | and∑
ikt∈I
(m)
t
δikt ,β(ikt ) <
∑
ikt∈I˜
(m)
t
δikt ,β(ikt ). If |I
(m)
t | = |I˜(m)t | and ∑ikt∈I(m)t δikt ,β(ikt ) = ∑ikt∈I˜(m)t
δikt ,β(ikt ), then we are indifferent between the two cardinality matchings and write (K
(m)
t , α, I(m)t ,
β) ∼ (K˜(m)t , α˜, I˜(m)t , β˜). If we have either (K(m)t , α, I(m)t , β)  (K˜(m)t , α˜, I˜(m)t , β˜) or (K(m)t , α,
I(m)t , β) ∼ (K˜(m)t , α˜, I˜(m)t , β˜), we write (K(m)t , α, I(m)t , β) % (K˜(m)t , α˜, I˜(m)t , β˜). Our optimal
multilevel matching problem is the following.
Problem 3.1. For given sets of cluster-level constraints A and unit-level constraints Ba, find a
matching (K(m)t , α, I(m)t , β) that satisfies A and Ba such that, for any other matching (K˜(m)t , α˜,
I˜(m)t , β˜) that also satisfies A and Ba, (K(m)t , α, I(m)t , β) % (K˜(m)t , α˜, I˜(m)t , β˜).
Intuition may suggest that the the best way to solve Problem 3.1 and match with multilevel data
is first to match clusters and then within matched clusters to match units. In our case study, this
would require first pairing schools and then, within pairs of schools, pairing students. However
this strategy will not always find the largest matched sample that is balanced as two schools
that are paired on their school level characteristics may have different student compositions so
that when their students are paired it may result in a smaller sample size than optimal. For this
reason, the optimal matching strategy needs to contemplate what is optimal both at the student
and school levels simultaneously. Applying Bellman’s (1957) principle of optimality, the optimal
matching strategy is first to match units across all the possible combinations of pairs of treated
and control clusters, and, once all possible combinations of matched units are known, then to
match clusters.
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In abstract terms, the following algorithm and proposition state this. To implement the optimal
assignments α and β, let akt,kc = 1 if treated cluster kt is paired to control cluster kc and
akt,kc = 0 otherwise; similarly let bikt ,ikc = 1 if treated unit i in treated cluster kt is paired to
control unit i in control cluster kc, and bikt ,ikc = 0 otherwise.
Algorithm 3.2. For each of the possible Kt ×Kc pairs of treated and control clusters, find the
optimal cardinality matching of units that satisfies Ba. This is, for each kt ∈ Kt and each kc ∈ Kc
find mkt,kc = maxb
∑
ikt∈Ikt
∑
ikc∈Ikc bikt ,ikc subject to b ∈ Ba. Then find the optimal cardinality
cluster matching that solves maxa
∑
kt∈Kt
∑
kc∈Kc mkt,kcakt,kc subject to a ∈ A.
Proposition 3.3. Algorithm 3.2 solves the optimal multilevel cardinality matching problem 3.1.
Proof. Let f(a, b) be the the total number of pairs of treated and control units matched by b
within pairs of treated and clusters matched by a. In the abstract, in Problem 3.1 we want to
maximize the function f(a, b) subject to the constraints A and Ba. This is, find a and b to solve
max
a,b
f(a, b) subject to a ∈ A, b ∈ Ba. (1)
In a trivial way, we may solve (1) by first solving
g(a) = max
b
f(a, b) subject to b ∈ Ba (2)
for each a ∈ A, and then solving
max
a
g(a) subject to a ∈ A. (3)
While (2) seems hard in general (because there are many possible choices of b), the nested
structure of the units-in-clusters problem makes it easier because f(a, b) separates into a sum
of parts for cluster pairs because the constraint sets A and Ba are disjoint. Algorithm 3.2 does
exactly this.
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In our case study, for each pairing of schools a, we find the best pairing of students b within
those schools (2), and then pick the best pairing of schools with the associated best pairing of
students for that pairing of schools (3). Again, while (2) seems hard in general (because there
are many possible student matches b across schools), the nested structure of the students-in-
schools problem makes it easier because f(a, b) separates into a sum of parts for school pairs.
For example, if treated school kt is paired to control school kc, then the contribution of schools
kt and kc is the same of number of pairs regardless of how the other schools are paired.
With Algorithm 3.2, the multilevel cardinality matching problem can be solved optimally by
breaking it into simpler matching subproblems and recursively finding the optimal match. This is
an application of dynamic programming to matching in observational studies that takes advantage
of the multilevel structure of the data (see Bertsekas 2005 for an extensive exposition of dynamic
programming).
3.3 Illustrative example
We present a simple example to fix ideas. In this example, there are 3 treated schools and 5 control
schools indexed by kt ∈ Kt = {1, ..., 3} and kc ∈ Kc = {1, ..., 5}, respectively. The first step of
our multilevel matching strategy as implemented with cardinality matching is to find the student
pair-matches across all the possible combinations of pairs of treated and control schools. Here,
since there are 3 treated schools and 5 control schools, we solve 3 × 5 = 15 student matching
problems.3 For each of these 15 combinations of pairs of treated and control schools, we use
cardinality matching and record the cardinality of the pair-matched students, mkt,kc (so m1,1 is
the number of students that were pair-matched between treated school and control school 1, m1,2
is the number of pair-matched students between treated school 1 and control school 2, and so
on). The size of the cardinalities mkt,kc will depend on the student covariate balance constraints,
denoted Ba, and the cardinality may be zero if the balance constraints cannot be met. Once
3We match the students within treated school 1 and control schools {1, ..., 5}, treated school 2 and control
schools {1, ..., 5}, and so on.
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we obtain all the mkt,kc ’s, the second step is to solve the school level matching problem, which
maximizes the total number of pair-matched students within pair-matched schools subject to
school level balance constraints, A. This problem is maxa∑kt∈Kt∑kc∈Kc mkt,kcakt,kc subject to
a ∈ A. Solving the problem backwards —from the students to the schools, instead of the
opposite— ensures that we find the overall optimum number of student matches. If we were to
do the opposite (this is, first match schools and then within matched schools match students),
then we would likely find a suboptimal solution as we show in the comparison study in Section
4.2 below.
3.4 Additional considerations
Note that if we had three or more levels (such as students within schools within districts), then
our multilevel matching strategy would extend naturally. With l levels, the strategy would require
first matching the lowest level l under the assumptions that levels l − 1, l − 2, ..., 1 have been
matched optimally, to then (once the matches at level l are completed) matching level l−1 under
the assumptions that levels l − 2, l − 3..., 1 have been matched optimally, and so on.
The multilevel matching problem above is formulated to maximize the size of the matched sample
in terms of students, but it can be easily modified to maximize a weighted combination of students
and clusters; namely, maxa
∑
kt∈Kt
∑
kc∈Kc mkt,kcakt,kc+λ
∑
kt∈Kt
∑
kc∈Kc akt,kc subject to a ∈ A,
for a suitable scalar λ. Also, the multilevel matching problem can be formulated to minimize a
covariate distance between students by using optimal matching to solve each of the component
problems. In all these cases, the optimal matching strategy is to match backwards, by first
matching the units and then matching the clusters.
We have discussed the optimality of our multilevel matching strategy from a mathematical pro-
gramming standpoint. From a statistical standpoint, this matching approach as implemented
with cardinality matching gives priority to reducing bias over increasing precision, and is optimal
in the sense that given a matching structure (e.g., pair matching) and degree of bias reduction
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(these are the covariate balancing requirements) it maximizes the accuracy of the study (by max-
imizing the size of the matched sample). More precisely, extending the argument in Kilcioglu and
Zubizarreta (2016), under a constant additive treatment effect model this approach minimizes
the variance of a difference-in-means effect estimator if the intracluster correlation is less than
one. In general, the statistical optimality of matching methods is an important area that remains
to be studied within a formal statistical framework.
4 Evaluation of the Matched Sample
4.1 Covariate Balance and Sample Size
After applying basic exclusion criteria, there are 64245 students in 517 schools, 150 private
subsidized and 367 public schools (henceforth treated and control schools respectively). Out of
the 64245 students, 15682 students are from treated schools and 48563 are from control schools.
Using the multilevel matching strategy above, we matched in two stages within similar groups
regions of the country (namely, regions I-III, IV-V, VI-VII, VIII, IX, X-XII and the Metropolitan
region).
At the student level, we used cardinality matching to find the largest balanced sample of pairs
of students across all the possible combinations of pairs of schools within the groups of regions.
In each of these matches we balanced the means of 19 covariates (including student test scores,
school test scores, and indicators for socioeconomic status and expected educational achievement;
see Table 1 for details),4 approximately fine balanced the marginal distribution of four nominal
covariates (sex, mother and father education, and household income; see Table 2) and balanced
marginal the distribution of two continuous covariates (the sum of the test scores in language
and mathematics at baseline). Figure 1 shows not only that the marginal distributions of the
baseline test scores are very closely balanced after matching but also their joint distribution. As
4To be precise, we required the absolute differences in means in these covariates to differ at most by 0.1
standard deviations. The matched sample that we found did not only satisfy these mean balance constraints but
achieved absolute differences in means smaller than 0.05 standard deviations. Please see Table 1 below.
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a matter of fact, the 95% bivariate normal density contours are almost indistinguishable after
matching.
Table 1: Covariate balance at the student level after matching. All the covariates are measured
in 2004. The last column shows standardized differences in means.
Covariate Mean Std. dif.
Private Public
Language score 244.84 244.75 0.00
Mathematics score 245.71 244.92 0.02
Natural science score 248.74 248.57 0.00
Social science score 244.38 244.49 -0.00
School language score 238.84 238.42 0.02
School mathematics score 239.89 239.32 0.03
School female proportion 0.51 0.51 -0.01
School number of students 84.23 84.17 0.00
School teacher to student ratio 8.22 8.14 0.04
Urban area 0.85 0.85 -0.00
Socioeconomic status A 0.13 0.13 -0.01
Socioeconomic status B 0.57 0.56 0.01
Socioeconomic status C 0.28 0.29 -0.01
Socioeconomic status D 0.02 0.01 0.02
Expected education: primary 0.01 0.01 -0.00
Expected education: secondary, technical-professional 0.72 0.69 0.05
Expected education: secondary, scientific-humanities 0.16 0.17 -0.04
Expected education: technical-professional 0.10 0.10 -0.01
Expected education: college 0.01 0.02 -0.05
At the school level, we used the modification of cardinality matching in the second stage of Algo-
rithm 3.2 and mean balanced 16 other covariates: percentage female, total enrollment, language
and math scores (plus indicators for missing values), urban area, parental income categories (1-5),
and socioeconomic groups (A-D). Again, covariates were exact matched for the 7 region groups
(for this, we basically solved different matching problems for each of these region groups). We
balanced all covariates with and without weighting for the size of the school; see Table 3. Note
that after matching all the differences in means are smaller than 0.05 standard deviations. In this
way, we matched 8802 students in 4401 pairs, and 280 schools in 140 pairs. In this match, all the
available regions of the country are represented in both the treatment and control groups.
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Table 2: Balance for nominal covariates at the student level. All the covariates are measured
in 2004. Approximate fine balance for sex, type of education of the mother and father, and
household income category. The tabulated values are counts of the number of students in each
category. In addition, matching was exact for groups of counties (not shown here).
Covariate School type
Private Public
Sex
Male 4634 4638
Female 4168 4164
Mother education
Primary school 4016 4026
Secondary school 2578 2577
Technical 176 173
College or higher 73 75
Missing 1959 1951
Father education
Primary school 3538 3552
Secondary school 2732 2724
Technical 196 195
College or higher 130 131
Missing 2206 2200
Household income category (in 1000 pesos)
[0, 100) 251 248
[100, 200] 3356 3373
(200, 400] 3346 3346
(400, 600] 974 971
(600, 1400] 289 291
> 1400 206 203
Missing 380 370
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Figure 1: Distribution of student test scores at baseline after matching. The baseline test scores
are measured in 2004. The ellipses trace the 95% bivariate normal density contours of the joint
distributions of test scores for the matched treated and control units. The contours are almost
identical showing that not only marginal distributions of the test scores are very closely balanced
but also their joint distribution.
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4.2 Comparison to Myopic Matching
We now compare the performance of our dynamic matching strategy to an alternative strategy
which first matches schools followed by matching students within these matched schools. We
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Table 3: Covariate balance at the school level after matching. Both means and standardized
differences are weighted by the number of students in each school. The last column shows
standardized differences in means.
Covariate Mean Std. dif.
Private Public
Female proportion 0.46 0.49 -0.09
Number of students 193.38 193.38 0.00
Language score 241.92 239.99 0.10
Mathematics score 231.21 228.92 0.09
Language score missing 0.02 0.02 -0.05
Mathematics score missing 0.02 0.02 -0.05
Urban area 0.92 0.94 -0.09
Income category 1 0.20 0.24 -0.08
Income category 2 0.67 0.66 0.02
Income category 3 0.12 0.10 0.05
Income category 4 0.01 0.00 0.08
Income category 5 0.00 0.00 0.00
Socioeconomic status A 0.30 0.35 -0.10
Socioeconomic status B 0.55 0.54 0.03
Socioeconomic status C 0.15 0.12 0.09
Socioeconomic status D 0.00 0.00 0.00
implement this alternative matching strategy using two different methods: optimal matching
(using a robust Mahalanobis distance matrix with calipers for violations on the propensity score;
see Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985 and Section 8.3 of Rosenbaum 2010) and cardinality matching,
using the approximation scheme in Zubizarreta and Kilcioglu (2016).5 We call these two more
standard strategies “myopic” because they make locally optimal matching decisions at the school
and student stages separately rather than collectively in view of the global optimum. The results
from this comparison are summarized in Table 4 below.
By construction, myopic optimal matching uses all the available observations, but results in sub-
stantial imbalances at both the school and student level. In fact, out of the 17 school-level
covariates, 4 of them have differences in means greater than 0.1 standard deviations after match-
5This approximation scheme solves a linear program relaxation of the integer programming problem in cardi-
nality matching and then rounds the solution by solving a linear program again or using a more specialized network
algorithm. This approximation may violate to some extent some of the balancing constraints but it runs quickly
(in polynomial time), and in many applications the violations to the balancing constraints are not substantial.
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Table 4: Comparison of matching methods.
Matches Imbalances Speed
Method Schools Students Means TV Problems Timeschools students solved (min)
Myopic optimal 149 9643 4 0.179 149 0.48matching
Myopic cardinality 143 4913 0 0.016 143 1.37matching†
Dynamic cardinality 140 8802 0 0.011 10261 148.43matching†
Note 1: For optimal matching, we used a robust Mahalanobis distance matrix (Rosenbaum 2010) with calipers
for violations on the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). For cardinality matching (†) we used the
approximation scheme in Zubizarreta and Kilcioglu (2016). In both cases, we used the R package designmatch.
Note 2: Under “Imbalances,” the first column (“Means schools”) shows the number of covariates that have
imbalance in means at the school level (there are 17 school covariates in total). In the second column, “TV”
denotes the total variation distance for the marginal distributions of key covariates at the student level (Pimentel
et al. 2015).
Note 3: Under “Speed,” the first column shows the total number of student matching problems solved, and
the second column shows the total time in minutes they took without parallelizing. On average, with the three
matching methods each student matching problem took less than a second to be solved.
ing, and the total variation distance (defined as the sum of the treated-minus-control absolute
value differences in percentage points across all categories of nominal covariates; Pimentel et al.
2015) for the marginal distributions of the covariates in Table 2 is more than 10 times larger
with optimal matching than with the cardinality matching methods. Myopic cardinality matching
achieves good covariate balance both at the school and student levels, but matches considerably
fewer students: 4913 students instead of the 8802 students matched by our strategy, which il-
lustrates why working backwards from the optimal solutions is better than working forward in
a greedy sense. This demonstrates that our dynamic strategy to multilevel matching reduces
imbalances and uses a larger portion of the sample.
In terms of speed, the dynamic matching method takes longer. On a standard desktop computer
(with a 3.4 GHz Intel Core i5 processor, 16 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 of memory, and the OS X
10.10.4 operating system), the dynamic method takes nearly two and a half hours, as opposed
to the 0.48 and 1.17 minutes needed for the two myopic methods. The dynamic method requires
more computing time, since it is considering all the possible combinations of pairs of treated and
control schools within groups of regions; in other words, it is solving 10261 student matching
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problems as opposed to 149 and 143 with the other methods. On average, with the dynamic
method, as well as with the other matching methods, each student matching problem takes
less than one second to be solved. Again, the difference in time is driven by the number of
student matching problems that each method is considering. To further reduce the computing
time required for the dynamic matching, one could find the student level matches in parallel by
separating all the possible pairs of treated and control schools into smaller mutually exclusive but
exhaustive pairs of treated and control schools.
4.3 Limited Overlap and the Estimand
In observational studies, a common limitation encountered in practice is limited overlap or lack
of common support of the covariate distributions across the treatment samples. As Crump et al.
(2009) note, lack of common support can lead to estimates that are highly biased, too variable,
and overly sensitive to model misspecification. When faced with limited overlap, investigators
often “trim” the samples and restrict their analyses to subsamples that have common support.
For example, Dehejia and Wahba (1999) discard the control units with an estimated propensity
score smaller (greater) than the minimum (maximum) one of the treated units. Formal methods
for trimming are proposed by Crump et al. (2009) and Rosenbaum (2012b). However, most
of these methods address the problem of limited overlap using the propensity score or another
summary of the covariates such as the Mahalanobis distance. In contrast, with our multilevel
matching strategy, cardinality matching addresses the common support problem without resorting
to a summary of the covariates, as it directly finds the largest subsamples of treated and control
units that meant the common support or balance constraints set by the investigator.
With all these methods, restricting the analysis to the samples of treated and control units that
overlap (or, ultimately, that are balanced) changes the estimand such that it only applies to
the population of comparable or marginal units which may or may not receive the treatment
(Rosenbaum 2012b). More specifically, the estimands that result from trimming units will be a
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more local versions of commonly used estimands such as the average treatment effect (ATE) or
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), and will depend on the sample data. Changing the
estimand in this way acknowledges the inherent limitations imposed by the data. It also makes
explicit that inferences to other target populations will require further modeling assumptions
(Crump et al. 2009). In other words, this approach places greater importance on internal as
opposed to external validity (Shadish et al. 2002).
In our study, we estimate the effect of a cluster-level treatment on a sample of comparable units
within comparable clusters. Specifically, we estimate the effect of attending private subsidized
(voucher) schools instead of public schools on a sample of students by selecting both comparable
students and schools. If we only selected schools to ensure common support and covariate
balance, our estimand would be the effect of a school-level intervention on the students of a
sample of comparable schools. However, since we also selected students (to ensure comparability
of the students within the schools), our estimand is the effect of a school-level intervention on a
sample of comparable students within comparable schools.
To obtain a basic understanding of how the matched sample differs from the larger population,
we describe the samples of matched treated and control students and compared them to the full
samples of students (Silber et al. 2015). Table 5 compares the means of the covariates in the
samples of students before matching (“All”) and in the unmatched and matched samples. For the
students in private schools, there are a number of significant differences between the matched
and unmatched samples (not denoted in the table for clarity in the exposition). The largest
differences are in urban area, with a lower proportion of the unmatched students living in urban
areas, and in socieconomic status, with the unmatched students having higher a socieconomic
status on average. These differences are less marked when comparing the matched and complete
(“All”) samples of students in private schools. In principle, our results could be generalized to
a population of students with characteristics similar to the ones of the matched samples, which
do not differ much from the original sample of students that that under the private subsidized
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school treatment. However, such generalizations from the sample to a larger population would
require additional assumptions and methods (Stuart et al. 2011; Hartman et al. 2015).
5 Outcome Analyses
Having found the matched sample, we now estimate the effect of attending a private voucher
school, test its significance, and assess the robustness of the findings to biases due to unobserved
covariates. We first assume that treatment is as-if randomly assigned to clusters conditional on
the matched pairs (Small et al. 2008) and explore whether our results would differ if we relax this
assumption using a sensitivity analysis for clustered observational studies developed by Hansen
et al. (2014).
5.1 Randomization Inference When Treatment is Assigned at the School
Level
Following Small et al. (2008), we collect in the set Ω the 2K treatment assignments for all
2K clusters, Z = (Z11, Z12, . . . , ZK2)T . If the probability of receiving treatment is equal for
each school in each matched pair, then the conditional distribution of Z given that there is
exactly one treated school in each pair equals the randomization distribution with Pr(Zkj =
1|yTkji, yCkji,xkji, ukji,Ω) = 1/2 for each school j in pair k. Write Y = (Y111, . . . , YK2,nk2)T
for the N = ∑k,j nk,j dimensional vector of observed responses with the same notation for yc,
which are potential responses under control.
We denote T = t(Z,Y) as our test statistic. Under the sharp null hypothesis of no treatment
effect, Y = yc, and therefore T = t(Z,yc). If treatment were randomly assigned within matched
pairs, then Pr{t(Z,Y) ≥ v|yTkji, yCkji,xkji, ukji,Ω} = Pr{t(Z,yc) ≥ v|yTkji, yCkji,xkji, ukji,Ω}
with Pr(Z = z|yTkji, yCkji,xkji, ukji,Ω) = 1/|Ω| for some cutoff value v.
For T , we use a test statistic from Hansen et al. (2014). This test statistic is a function of qkji,
which is a score or rank given to Ykji, so that under the null hypothesis, the qkji are functions
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of the yCkji and xkji, and they do not vary with Zkj. To make qkji resistant to outliers, we use
the ranks of the residuals when Ykji is regressed on the student level covariates using Huber’s
method of m-estimation following Small et al. (2008). The test statistic T is
T =
K∑
k=1
BkQk
where
Bk = 2Zk1 − 1 = ±1, Qk = wk
nk1
nk1∑
i=1
qk1i − wk
nk2
nk2∑
i=1
qk2i.
Hansen et al. (2014) show that T is the sum of k independent random variables each taking
the value ±Qk with probability 1/2, so E(T ) = 0 and var(T ) = ∑Kk=1Q2k. The central limit
theorem implies that as K → ∞, then T/
√
var(T ) converges in distribution to the standard
Normal distribution. In the above equation, wk defines the weights which are a function of nkj.
Hansen et al. (2014) discuss possible choices for wk. One possibility is to use constant weights,
wk ∝ 1.6
If we test the hypothesis of a shift effect instead of the hypothesis of no effect, we can apply
the method of Hodges and Lehmann (1963) to estimate the private school effect. The Hodges-
Lehmann (HL) estimate of τ is the value of τ0 that when subtracted from Ykji makes T as as
close as possible to its expectation under the null. Intuitively, the point estimate τˆ is the value
of τ0 such that T equals 0 when Tτ0 is computed from Ykji − Zkjτ0. Using constant effects is
convenient, but this assumption can be relaxed; see Rosenbaum (2003). If the treatment has an
additive effect, Ykji = yCkji + τ then a 95% confidence interval for the additive treatment effect
is formed by testing a series of hypotheses H0 : τ = τ0 and retaining the set of values of τ0 not
rejected at the 5% level.
6Another possibility is to use weights that are proportional to the total number of students in a matched cluster
pair: wk ∝ nk1 + nk2 or wk = (nk1 + nk2)/
∑K
`=1(n`1 + n`2). An analysis, with these weights did not alter the
results.
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5.2 Comparative Effectiveness of Public Versus Private Subsidized Schools
We now test the hypothesis of no effect for private subsidized schools on test scores. We measure
test scores using an additive measure of language and mathematics scores. The approximate one-
sided p-value for the test of the sharp null hypothesis is 0.207. If there are no hidden confounders,
the point estimate of the private subsidized treatment effect is τˆ = 2.55 with a 95% confidence
interval of -3.78 and 8.72. Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that attending a private
subsidized school has no effect on test scores. In the education literature, an effect size of 0.20
of a standard deviation is considered to be an educationally meaningful effect. Our estimated
treatment effect is only 0.027 of a standard deviation. Therefore, our estimated treatment effect
is well below the threshold for a meaningful effect. We next explore the likelihood that bias from
a hidden confounder masks a treatment effect.
5.3 Test of Equivalence and Sensitivity Analysis
In an observational study, one concern is that bias from a hidden covariate can give the impression
that a treatment effect exists when in fact no effect is present. Bias from hidden confounders
can also mask an actual treatment effect leaving the investigator to conclude there is no effect
when in fact such an effect exists. We explore this possibility using a test of equivalence and a
sensitivity analysis (Rosenbaum 2008; Rosenbaum and Silber 2009; Rosenbaum 2010).
Above we were unable to reject the null hypothesis that τ = 0 for all students. Next, we apply
a test of equivalence to test the hypotheses that τ is not small. Under a test of equivalence, we
test the following null hypothesis H(δ)6= : |τ | > δ. Rejecting H(δ)6= provides a basis for asserting
with confidence that |τ | < δ. H(δ)6= is the union of two exclusive hypotheses:
←−
H
(δ)
0 : τ ≤ −δ
and −→H (δ)0 : τ ≥ δ, and H(δ)6= is rejected if both
←−
H
(δ)
0 and
−→
H
(δ)
0 are rejected (Rosenbaum and
Silber 2009). We can apply the two tests without correction for multiple testing since we test
two mutually exclusive hypotheses.
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With a test of equivalence, it is not possible to demonstrate a total absence of effect, but if this
were a randomized trial, we could test that our estimated effect is not as large as δ by rejecting
H
(δ)
6= : |τ | > δ. Since the treatment was not randomly assigned, it may be the case that we
reject the null hypothesis of equivalence due to hidden confounding. However, using a sensitivity
analysis we may find evidence that the test of equivalence is insensitive to biases from nonrandom
treatment assignment.
Thus far we have assumed that within matched pairs, receipt of the treatment is effectively
random conditional on the matches. We consider how sensitive our conclusions are to violations
of this assumption using a model of sensitivity analysis discussed in Rosenbaum (2002, chapter 4).
In our study, matching on observed covariates xkji made students more similar in their chances
of being exposed to the treatment. However, we may have failed to match on an important
unobserved covariate ukji such that xkji = xkji′ ∀ k, j, i, i′, but possibly ukji 6= ukji′ . If true,
the probability of being exposed to treatment may not be constant within matched school pairs.
To explore this possibility, we use a sensitivity analysis. First, define pik as the probability that
student i in pair k was treated. For two matched students in pair k, say i and i′, because they
have the same observed covariates xkji = xkji′ it may be true that pik = pik′ . However, if these
two students differ in an unobserved covariate, ukji 6= ukji′ , then these two students may differ
in their odds of being exposed to the private school treatment by at most a factor of Γ ≥ 1 such
that
1
Γ ≤
pik/(1− pik′)
pik′/(1− pik) ≤ Γ, ∀ k, k
′, with xkji = xkji′ ∀ j, i, i′. (4)
If Γ = 1, then pik = pik′ , and the randomization distribution for T is valid. If Γ > 1, then quantities
such as p-values and point estimates are unknown but are bounded by a known interval. In a
sensitivity analysis, we observe at which value of Γ the upper bound on the p-value exceeds 0.05.
If the value of Γ is large, we can be confident that it would take a large bias from a hidden
confounder to reverse the conclusions of the study. The derivation for the sensitivity analysis as
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applied to our test statistic T is in Hansen et al. (2014).
Under a test of equivalence, we may be able to reject H(δ)6= : |τ | > δ if the p-value from the test
is low. Rejecting this null, allows us to infer that the estimate treatment effect is not as large
as δ. We then apply the sensitivity analysis to understand whether this inference is sensitive to
biases from nonrandom treatment assignment. In the analysis, we observe at what value of Γ the
p-value exceeds the conventional 0.05 threshold for each test. If this Γ value is relatively large,
we can be confident that the test of equivalence is not sensitive to hidden bias from nonrandom
treatment assignment.7
5.4 How Much Bias Would Need to be Present to Mask a Positive
Effect of Private Subsidized Schools?
In this test, the null hypothesis asserts H(δ)6= : |τ | > δ for some specified δ > 0. Rejection of this
null hypothesis provides evidence that the effect of attending a private voucher school on test
scores is less than δ. What values should we select for δ? A number of studies in the literature
have found that private voucher schools increase test score achievement. The smallest effect
size in the extant literature is 0.15 of a standard deviation (Sapelli and Vial 2002). However,
among low income students the effects may be as large as 0.5 of a standard deviation, and Sapelli
and Vial (2005) find an effect size of 0.6 standard deviations. These results suggest a range of
possible effects from 0.15 to 0.6 standard deviations. To that end, we use three values for δ of
0.15, 0.30 and 0.6 standard deviations. This allows us to test whether the point estimates in our
study are equivalent to small, medium or large voucher effects. Thus we define three values δ1,
δ2, and δ3 to correspond to these three different possible effect sizes.
We now apply the test of equivalence and sensitivity analysis to the results. For this match, we
are able to reject H(δ1)6= with p-value of 0.035 when Γ = 1. Therefore, we are able to reject
7Hansen et al. (2014) note that sensitivity to hidden bias may vary with the choice of weights wk. To
understand whether different weights lead to different sensitivities to hidden confounders, we can conduct a
different sensitivity analysis for each set of weights and correct these tests using a multiple testing correction
(Rosenbaum 2012b). We then report a single corrected p-value for a value of Γ.
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the null that the smaller treatment effect we observe in this design is equivalent to the smallest
estimated effect in the extant literature. However, we find that when Γ is as small as 1.09 the
p-value for the test of equivalence is 0.053. Thus if students differed by as much as 9 percent
in the odds of being treated that could explain our inference. For a moderate effect size of 0.30
standard deviations, we can easily reject H(δ2)6= when Γ = 1 (p > .001), and we find that when
Γ = 2.8 the p-value is 0.049. A bias of magnitude Γ = 2.8 means that two matched students
might differ in terms of an unobserved ukji such that one student is almost three as like as the
other to attend a private voucher school before it would alter our conclusions. Finally, for a large
effect size we find that when Γ = 9.8, the p-value is 0.049. Therefore, it would take a very large
bias for our conclusions about a large treatment effect to be altered.
6 Summary and Discussion
Clustered observational studies with hierarchical or multilevel data are very common in the health
and social sciences. In these settings, we have shown that the optimal matching strategy is,
under the assumption that clusters have been matched optimally, first to match units and then,
considering these optimal unit-level matches, to match clusters. We emphasized that this strategy
explicitly uses the nested structure of the data by breaking the multilevel matching problem into
simpler, smaller matching subproblems that are solved only once and that can be solved in parallel
to yield an optimal global solution. We implemented this strategy using and extending cardinality
matching to find the largest matched sample of pairs of treated and control units within pairs of
treated and control clusters that is balanced according to specifications given by the investigator.
Unlike other matching methods for multilevel data, this implementation of our matching strategy
is optimal in the sense that it maximizes the size of the matched sample (or minimizes the
covariate distances between matched units) and it does not require estimating the propensity
score (because it directly balances covariates as specified by the investigator). As we outlined,
these specifications for covariate balance are not restricted to mean balance, but extend to other
forms of distributional balance such as fine balance, x-fine balance, and strength-k balance. This
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multilevel matching strategy also facilitates sensitivity analyses to hidden biases due to unobserved
covariates, and it readily extends to clustered observational studies with three or more levels of
data.
The proposed multilevel matching strategy is optimal when the matching criterion is a sum of
components that correspond to matched units within matched clusters, such as the total number
of matched units (as in our case study), or, for example, the total sum of covariate distances
between matched units. To our knowledge, this is the first application of dynamic and integer
programming ideas to observational studies.
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